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ABSTRACT The features of logic programming that 
seem unconventional from the viewpoint of classical logic 
can be explained in terms of constructivistic logic. We 
motivate and propose a constructivistic proof theory of 
non-Horn logic programming. Then, we apply this for-
malization for establishing results of practical interest. 
First, we show that 'stratification can be motivated in a 
simple and intuitive way. Relying on similar motivations, 
we introduce the larger classes of 'loosely stratified' and 
'constructively consistent' programs. Second, we give a 
formal basis for introducing quantifiers into queries and 
logic programs by defining 'constructively domain 
independent* formulas. Third, we extend the Generalized 
Magic Sets procedure to loosely stratified and construc-
tively consistent programs, by relying on a 'conditional 
fixpoini procedure. 
1. Introduction 
Though close to conventional reasoning, logic program-
ming departs from classical logic in two respects. First, it 
confines reasoning to limited kinds of deductions. In par-
ticular, indefinite statements like disjunctive or existential 
formulas cannot be derived from logic programs. Second, 
logic programming draws unconventional inferences by in-
terpreting negation as failure. However, despite of non-
classical features, logic programming appears rather 
natural. Moreover, its unconventional reasoning features 
seem intuitively founded. 
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In this paper, we propose a constructivistic rationalization 
of logic programming. Constructivism is a school in logic 
that tries to reestablish certain parts of mathematics in more 
intuitive ways. There are many constructivistic theories. 
Some retain classical reasoning and confine it to certain 
types of deduction. Others rely on unconventional in-
ference principles. Logic programming does both. We 
show that constructivism is surprisingly close to logic pro-
gramming. The features of logic programming that are un-
conventional from the classical viewpoint find immediate 
constructivistic explanations. 
A number of formalizations of logic programming have 
already been proposed. Chandra and Harel [CH 85], Apt, 
Blair, and Walker [A* 88], and Van Gelder [VGE 88] ex-
press the semantics of Horn and non-Horn programs in 
terms of conventional logic models and fixpoint operators, 
following van Emden and Kowalski [vEK 76]. In [GR 
84, GAB 85], Gabbay and Reyle propose to extend Prolog 
with non-classical, hypothetical implications. In [GS 86], 
Gabbay and Sergot advocate for replacing negation as 
failure by the classical logic treatment 'negation as 
inconsistency*. Fitting [FIT 85] relies on a three-valued 
logic for formalizing the behaviour of logic programs that 
either fail, or succeed, or fall into infinite backtracking. A 
modal logic interpretation of negation as failure is 
described by Gabbay in [GAB 86], etc. The different read-
ings contribute to enlighten various aspects of logic pro-
gramming. 
The resemblance between logic programming and con-
structivistic logic has already been noticed by Bojadziev. In 
a short article [BOJ 86], he gives a constructivistic inter-
pretation of Horn programs and negative goals. Remarks 
with constructivistic flavour can be found in most studies 
devoted to negation in logic programming. However, we do 
not know any previous proposal to interpret non-Horn logic 
programs in constructivistic terms and to exploit this inter-
pretation. We show that a constructivistic reading of logic 
programming answers the question of the declarative 
semantics of non-Horn programs in a simple and natural 
manner. In addition, we apply this reading to solving prac-
tical problems of various kinds. 
In this paper, because of space limitations, we do not give 
proofs and we consider function-free logic programs. 
However, the constructivistic rationalization of logic pro-
gramming we introduce here applies also to logic programs 
with functions. In particular, i t gives very intuitive explana-
tions of necessary requirements such as well-foundedness 
or local stratification [PRZ 88a, PRZ 88b]. The proofs, a 
treatment of logic programs with functions, and connected 
results can be found in the full version [BRY 88a] of this 
paper. 
The first part of this paper proposes a constructivistic 
axiomatic system, which we call Causal Predicate Calculus 
(CPC), as a proof-theoretic formalization of non-Horn logic 
programs. In order to establish the factual decidability of 
CPC, we extend the fixpoint procedure for Horn 
programs [vEK 76] into a proof procedure for CPC, which 
we call 'conditional fixpoint\ by introducing some con-
ditional reasoning. We prove the equivalence between the 
proof-theoretic reading of non-Horn programs with CPC 
and the model-theoretic one by Apt, Blair, Walker [A* 88] 
and Van Gelder [VGE 88]. 
The second part of this paper is devoted to applying the 
constructivistic axiomatization of logic programming. We 
prove results of practical consequence in three concerns: 
For motivating the syntactical restrictions imposed on logic 
programs in simple and intuitive manners; for extending 
logic programs with new features; and for proving results 
on certain database query evaluation methods. 
More precisely, we show that stratification [A* 88, VGE 
88] and local stratification [PRZ 88a, PRZ 88b] are suf-
ficient conditions of 'constructive consistency', i.e., consis-
tency in CPC. We introduce the class of 'loosely stratified' 
programs. This property, which is less stringent than 
stratification and local stratification, appears to be more 
convenient for practical use. Like stratification but unlike 
local stratification, loose stratification can be checked with-
out rule instantiation. We establish, for stratified programs, 
the equivalence between the proof-theoretic formalization 
with CPC and the model-theoretic one proposed in [A* 
88, VGE 88]. 
We then consider queries with quantifiers. We introduce 
the concept of 'constructive domain independence* (cdi) as 
a proof-theoretic counterpart to the model-theoretic notion 
of 'domain independence' studied by Fagin [FAG 80] and 
proposed by Kuhns [KUH 67] under the name of 
'definiteness'. The new concept 'constructive domain 
independence' refines and formally motivates syntactical 
properties previously considered, such as 'safety' intro-
duced by Ullman [ULL 80], 'range-restriction' due to 
Nicolas [NIC 81], or 'allowedness' investigated by 
Clark [CLA 78], Lloyd and Topor[LT 86], and 
Shepherdson [SHE 88]. It gives a logical, constructivistic 
explanation of the need to keep ordered certain conjunc-
tions in logic programs, a feature traditionally considered 
non-logical and procedural. As opposed to the classical 
domain independence, the constructive domain indepen-
dence is a decidable and syntactically recognizable 
property. It therefore constitutes a practical basis for intro-
ducing quantifiers into logic programs and queries. 
In logic, proofs are declaratively defined, i.e., proofs are 
considered independently from any proof procedure. The 
definition of CPC induces a declarative definition of con-
structive proofs. We make use of this definition and of the 
conditional fixpoint procedure for extending in a quite 
simple manner the Generalized Magic Sets procedure [BC* 
86, BR 87] - a proof procedure for recursive logic programs 
also proposed under the name of Alexander procedure [R* 
86] - to constructively consistent non-Horn programs. More 
precisely, we show that, although the rewritings of the 
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Generalized Magic Sets procedure compromise stratifica­
tion, they preserve constructive consistency. This gives rise 
to apply the conditional fixpoint procedure to evaluate the 
rewritten programs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is this intro­
duction. Following [vEK 76], Section 2 shortly sum­
marizes how both model theory and proof theory convey 
the declarative semantics of logic programming. Section 3 
gives a brief outline of the principles of constructivism. In 
Section 4, we develop the Causal Predicate Calculus (CPC) 
for formalizing logic programming. We apply this for­
malism to practical problems in Section 5 . In Section 6 we 
summarize the main results of the paper and indicate direc­
tions for further research. 
2. Model-theoretic and proof-theoretic semantics 
Given certain axioms, mathematical logic distinguishes be­
tween two complementary issues: The interpretation of the 
axioms by some classes of mathematical structures, and the 
construction of proofs from the axioms. The first issue is 
called model theory, the second proof theory. Intuitively, 
model theory is concerned with the study of the Mworld(s)" 
described by the axioms while proof theory is devoted to 
the techniques of inferring new properties from those ex­
plicitly stated by the axioms. 
In logic programming, both the model theoretic and the 
proof theoretic readings are useful - i f not necessary - for 
conveying the semantics attached to sets of axioms. This 
has been observed by van Emden and Kowalski in [vEK 
76]. In order to promote the language of Horn clauses as a 
programming language, they have investigated on the one 
hand the close correspondence between denotational 
semantics of programs and model theory, and between 
operational semantics and proof theory on the other hand. 
Some logicians use the word 'semantics' in place of model 
theory and call 'syntax' the proof theory - see, e.g., [CHU 
56]. Instead, we give here to the term 'semantics' the same 
meaning as in programming language theory. 
The denotational semantics of a program describes the ob­
jects and structures that are consulted or constructed by the 
program. The operational semantics provides with a 
description of the operations performed by the program, 
without necessarily defining the implemented procedure. 
Viewing logic as a programming language raises two ques­
tions: "What is a proof?" and "How to generate proofs?", 
i.e., the complementary questions of giving declarative and 
procedural definitions to the operational semantics. 
Despite a fallacious appearance of simplicity, non-Horn 
programs raise a severe difficulty: Their operational seman­
tics - or underlying proof theory - cannot be defined in 
classical logic. As opposed to Horn programs, they perform 
inferences that do not always conform to classical logic and 
conventional reasoning. For example, the rules ρ <- r Λ - i q 
and q * - r Λ - φ are not identically interpreted though 
equivalent in classical logic. Conveying the same non-
classical interpretation of implications, constructivism is 
appropriate to formalize declaratively the operational 
semantics of non-Horn programs. 
A procedural, proof-theoretic treatment of non-Horn 
programs has been developed by Lloyd in terms of the 
SLDNF-resolution proof procedure [LLO 84]. As opposed, 
the proof-theory we propose here is independent of any 
procedure. I t is declarative and therefore easily applicable 
to proof procedures that are not based on SLDNF-
resolution, e.g., the Generalized Magic Sets [BC* 86, BR 
87] or Alexandre procedure [R* 86]. 
3. Constructivism: An outline 
A brief outline of the principles of constructivistic logic is 
proposed in order to show that it surprisingly resembles 
logic programming. Refer to [TRO 77] for a detailed over­
view of constructivism in mathematics. 
There is no clear-cut definition of constructivism. Accord­
ing to Quine [QUI 70], constructivism can be broadly 
described as "intolerance of methods that lead to affirming 
the existence of things of some sort without showing how 
to find one". Constructivism does not allow indefiniteness 
in proofs. It rejects proofs affirming the truth of Fj ν F 2 
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without telling which one of Fj and F 2 holds. Similarly, 
indefinite existence conveyed by existential quantifications 
is not constructively provable: A constructive proof of 
3x F[x] does exhibit a term satisfying F. 
A classical example of non-constructive reasoning is the 
following proof of the existence of irrational numbers ρ and 
q such that p q is rational: 
is either rational or irrational. I f it is ra­
tional, take ρ = q = V5 which is known to be 
irrational. Hence, p q is rational. I f 
is irrational, take ρ = (V2)^  and q = V5, 
hence p q = 2 is rational. 
This proof is not constructive because it draws con­
sequences from a disjunctive hypothesis - is either 
rational or irrational - which is not based on established 
facts - the proof does not show whether is rational or 
not. In other words, constructivism rejects excluded mid­
dle. 
Examples of constructive proofs are easily found in math­
ematics and computer science: It is a general inclination to 
prefer constructive proofs to non-constructive ones. The 
results given in this paper are all constructively established 
(for not debating on the legitimacy of non-constructed 
foundations for a constructivistic theory). 
It is interesting to recall that the introduction of non-
constructive proofs into mathematics led to controversies. 
In fact, until the end of the 19 t h century and Cantor's set 
theory, mathematics was constructivistic. "This is not 
mathematics. It is theology", said a mathematician about 
the non-constructive techniques introduced by 
Cantor [CAL 79]. Though these techniques are now con­
sidered as providing "a paradise the mathematicians do not 
want be driven from", as Hilbert said, contemporary math­
ematicians revive constructivism, with the aim to provide 
"realistic" and intuitive motivations to classical results -
see, e.g., [BIS 67]. 
The constructivistic interpretation of disjunctive and ex­
istential statements corresponds to the practice in logic pro­
gramming. Logic programming prevents the derivation of 
indefinite information by forbidding disjunction and ex­
istential quantification in heads of rules. A constructivistic 
view of logic programming is interesting because it is 
usually more intuitive to people not trained in formal logic, 
like most of the database and expert system users. 
Assuming an intuitive understanding of the proofs of 
ground atomic formulas, constructive proofs can be formal­
ized as follows [BRO 54, KRE 65]: 
Definition 3.1 
A. Closed formulas: 
1. A constructive proof of F J A F 2 consists in a 
constructive proof of Fx and a constructive 
proof of F 2 . 
2. A constructive proof of F j v F 2 consists in a 
constructive proof of Fx or in a constructive 
proof of F 2 . 
3. A constructive proof of Fj => F 2 consists in 
specifying a procedure Τ which transforms 
any constructive proof Pj of Fx into a con­
structive proof TOPj) of F 2 . 
4. - iF is defined as F => false. 
5. I f the variable χ ranges over the domain D, a 
constructive proof of Vx F[x] is a procedure 
Τ which, on application to any pair (t,p) of a 
term t and a constructive proof ρ that t€D, 
yields a constructive proof T(t,p) of F[t]. 
6. I f the variable χ ranges over the domain D, a 
constructive proof of 3x F[x] consists in a 
term t, in a constructive proof of teD, and 
then in a constructive proof of F[t]. 
B. Open formulas: 
A constructive proof of an open formula 
F[xj, . . . ,x n ] with free variables χ ρ x n ranging 
over the domain D consists in a tuple (tj , . . . ,^) of 
terms, in η constructive proofs of t^ e D, and then 
in a constructive proof of Fft j , . . . ,^] . 
Though Definition 3.1 seems rather natural, i t modifies 
considerably the notion of proof of an implication. 
Moreover, it strongly restricts proofs of disjunctions and of 
quantified expressions. 
From a constructivistic viewpoint implications are not 
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"hidden disjunctions". The formulas ρ => q and - φ ν q are 
not constructively equivalent. The same holds for 
r A —·ρ => q and r Λ - . q => p. Constructivism is causalistic: 
Implications are viewed as inferring new information from 
already proved information, like in logic programming. In 
constructivistic logic, the formula - φ => ρ is considered 
equivalent to false, according to the intuition that it is im­
possible to transform a proof of - ip into a proof of p. 
From a constructivistic viewpoint, a disjunction ρ ν - φ is 
not necessarily true, in case both ρ and - ip are not construc­
tively provable. Proofs of quantified formulas are con­
siderably constrained. Constructive proofs of quantified 
expressions reduce to proofs of ground expressions. This 
corresponds to the logic programming practice. 
Note finally that Definition 3.1 induces the concept of 
'ordered conjunction'. For example, a constructive proof 
of an open formula F[x] consists in a constructive proof 
that a term t belongs to the domain followed by a construc­
tive proof of F[t]. The need to keep ordered certain con­
junctions in logic programs for avoiding incorrect evalua­
tions and undesirable behaviours is classically viewed as a 
non-logical, procedural feature. In fact, it can be explained 
in logic by the restriction to constructive proofs. 
Restricting the concept of proof requires in turn either to 
restrict the axioms, the logical axioms as well as the proper 
axioms, or to rely on non-classical inference principles. 
Adopting modus ponens - i f formulas Fj and Fj => F 2 hold, 
then the formula F 2 is provable - imposes for example to 
reject axioms such as: 
A j : p = > q v r 
A 2 : Vx p(x) => Vy q(x,y) 
Indeed, i f ρ is provable, Ax would induce by modus ponens 
q v r . Similarly, i f p(t) holds, then modus ponens permits to 
derive Vy q(t,y) from A 2 . 
Various constructivistic formal systems have been 
proposed, e.g., [GOD 58, PRA 65, FIT 69]. Some of them 
rely on non-classical rules of inference. Others, e.g., [HEY 
66], allow classical inference principles and express the 
constructivistic restriction by constraining the syntax of the 
axioms. Logic programming does both. It has the classical 
inference principle modus ponens and constrains the syntax 
of the axioms. It has negation by failure as an unconven­
tional inference principle. 
The following syntactical constraints on the axioms 
guarantee constructivism under modus ponens: 
• Definiteness: 
No axiom an no conjunct of an axiom is a 
disjunction. No axiom and no conjunct of an 
axiom is an existential formula. 
I f Fx => F 2 is an axiom or a conjunct of an 
axiom, then F 2 contains no disjunctions, no 
implications, and no quantified formulas. 
I f Q J X J . . . Q ^ Fj => F 2 (Qj denotes either V or 
3) is an axiom or a conjunct of an axiom, then 
Qj = V i f x{ is free in in F 2 , and F 2 contains no 
disjunctions, no implications, and no quan­
tified formulas. 
• Positivitv of consequents: 
The consequent F 2 of an implicative conjunct 
Fj => F 2 or Qi* i . . .Q n x n F i => F 2 of an axiom 
is neither a negated formula, nor a conjunction 
containing a negated formula. 
These conditions are familiar to logic programmers. Note 
that they do not impose that the axioms are safe [ULL 80], 
range-restricted [NIC 81], or allowed [LT 86,VGT 
87, SHE 88]. They do not preclude axioms that are ground 
negative literals, or (mutually) recursive axioms, or im­
plicative axioms with negations in their premisses. 
Lemma 3 Λ 
A formula satisfying the conditions of definite­
ness and of positivity of consequents is of one of 
the following types: 
• Implicative formula 
F 1 = > F 2 
where Fx is a closed formula and F 2 is a 
ground atom or a conjunction of ground 
atoms. 
• Quantified implicative formula 
Q l x l » Q n x n F l = > F 2 
where Qt = V i f x{ is a free variable in F 2 , 
and where F 2 is an atom or a conjunction 
of atoms. 
• Ground literal. 
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• Conjunction of formulas of the above-
mentioned types. 
In the rest of the paper, we shall make use of the following, 
slightly extended definition of a rule, that allows negations, 
quantifiers and disjunctions in bodies of rules. 
Definition 3.2 
A rule is an expression of the form 
A ^ , . . . ^ ^ , . . . ^ ] < - F ^ , . . . ^ ^ . . . ^ ] 
where the head of the rule 
A[xj,...,x n,Zj,...,Zp] 
is an atom in which the x ^ and the ZjS are free 
and where the body of the rule 
is a formula in which the x^ and the yjS are free. 
It denotes the implicative formula: 
V x 1 . . . V x n V y 1 . . . V y m V z 1 . . . V z p 
F [ x 1 , . . . , x n f y l f . . M y m ] => A ^ , . . . ^ ^ 
A rule is a Horn rule i f its body does not contain 
atoms with negative polarity. A fact is a ground 
atom. 
Proposition 3.1 
A set of axioms satisfying the conditions of 
definiteness and of positivity of consequents is 
constructively equivalent to a set of rules and 
ground literals. 
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume in the sequel 
that axioms satisfying the conditions of definiteness and of 
positivity of consequents are always rules or ground 
literals. By Proposition 3.1 there is no loss of generality. 
4. The Causal Predicate Calculus 
Though imposing many of the syntactical restrictions of 
logic programs, the conditions of definiteness and of 
positivity of consequents, or equivalently the restriction to 
facts and rules, do not suffice to formalize non-Horn logic 
programming. Logic programming conforms in addition to 
the following principles: 
1. Negation as failure principle: -»F holds i f F is 
not provable. 
2, Domain closure principle: Variables range 
over the terms occurring in the axioms or in 
provable facts. 
3. Decidability principle: Facts are effectively 
decidable, i.e., a procedure that decides 
whether a fact is provable or not exists and is 
known. 
The following axiomatic system expresses these principles 
in constructivistic logic. We call it Causal Predicate Cal­
culus (CPC). It formalizes the operational semantics of 
non-Horn logic programs independently from any proof 
procedure. 
Upper case characters denote formulas. The symbol *&* 
denotes ordered conjunction: F & G means that the proof of 
F has to precede that of G. Proofs have to be understood 
according to Definition 3 . 1 . Legal inferences are expressed 
as usual with the symbol Ί - ' . 
• Inference principles: 
1 . modus ponens 
2. negation as failure 
• Axiom schemata: 
1 . - « F A F I- false 
2. - F = > F I - false 
3 . F I - F v G 
4. G I - F v G 
5 . F A G I - F 
6. F A G I- G 
7. dom(t )&F[t ] I - 3xF[x] 
8. - . (3x- ,F[x]) I - VxF[x] 
9. V x F [ x ] I - F[t] (t free for χ in F) 
• Conditions on the proper axioms: 
The proper axioms are rules or ground literals. 
• Domain axioms: 
For each n-ary predicate ρ occurring in a proper 
axiom, there are η axioms ( i = 1 , n ) : 
d o m i x ^ ^ p i x j , . . . ^ , . . . ^ ) 
• Finiteness Principle: 
A l l proofs are finite. 
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The first axiom schema and the finiteness principle are 
usually not made explicit. They are implicitly assumed in 
all axiomatic systems. Here, we make them explicit for two 
reasons. First, we would like to emphasize that false is 
provable in constructivistic logic not only with Schema 1 
but also with Schema 2, as opposed to classical logic. 
Second, the finiteness principle induces severe restrictions 
on logic programs with functions [BRY 88a]. 
We shall call *logic program' a finite set of rules and 
ground facts. Given a logic program LP, its domain, noted 
*dom(LP)\ is by definition the set of terms occurring in 
dom-facts that are constructively provable in CPC with 
proper axioms LP. The domain of a logic program is a 
subset, possibly strict, of its Herbrand universe. Therefore, 
the domains of function-free logic programs are finite. It 
follows that universally quantified and negated formulas 
can be decided in finite time in any function-free logic 
program. 
In CPC disjunctive statements like ρ ν - ip are true, thanks 
to negation as failure. Logic programs are CPCs, but not 
all CPCs are logic programs since CPCs may have negative 
literals as axioms. Horn programs are consistent since nei­
ther Schema 1 nor Schema 2 can apply. Similarly, Schema 
1 is irrelevant to non-Horn logic programs. 
Provided one knows that the proper axioms are consistent, 
e.g., because of their syntactical structure, then the axiom 
schemata 1 and 2 are useless. They are usually omitted by 
logicians who always assume consistency of the proper 
axioms. They are needed - at least for theoretical reasons -
in logic programming and databases where such assump­
tions cannot always be made. In Section 5.1, we show that 
the properties Stratification' and 'local stratification' en­
sure consistency of logic programs, thus permitting to dis­
card Schema 2. 
According to the definition of a rule and to the schemata 7 
and 8, the rule 
p (x )< - - , q (x )Ar (x ) 
would be evaluated like the rule 
p(x) < - dom(x) & [-iq(x) Λ Γ (Χ) ] 
This is inefficient since 'r(x) ' is a more restricted range for 
x. In Section 5.2 and in [BRY 88b], we show how to avoid 
the domain predicates. 
We conclude this section by introducing a proof procedure, 
which we call 'conditional fixpoint', in order to establish 
the factual decidability of CPC with function-free axioms. 
The procedure relies on a 'conditional immediate 
consequence' operator T c which we define first, 
In presence of non-Horn rules, the immediate consequence 
operator Τ [vEK 76] is non-monotonic [A* 88, VGE 88]. 
We restore monotonicity with T c by introducing some con­
ditional reasoning. Instead of facts, conditional statements 
are obtained by delaying the evaluation of negative literals. 
Consider for example the rule 
p(x) * - q(x) A -nr(x) 
I f a fact q(a) holds, delayed evaluation of -Tr(a) yields the 
conditional statement 
p(a) <—>r(a) 
T c is the immediate consequence operator that generates 
facts from Horn rules, and conditional statements from 
non-Horn rules. 
We make use of the following notations in the definition of 
T c . Given a conjunction of literals B , we shall denote by 
*pos(B)* ('neg(B)', resp.) the conjunction of all positive 
(negative, resp.) literals in B. I f there is no positive 
(negative, resp.) literals in B, then pos(B) (neg(B), resp.) 
reduces to true. We shall call 'conditional statement' a 
ground rule the body of which is a negative literal or a 
conjunction of negative literals and of true. 
Definition 4.1 
The conditional immediate consequence TC(LP) 
of a logic program LP is the set of all ground 
rules 
Η σ < - neg(Ba) A C J A . . . Λ C n 
that verify the conditions: 
• (Η B) € LP 
• σ is a substitution of terms in dom(LP) 
for variables in the rule Η < - Β 
• pos(Ba) = Ax A ... Λ \ (n > 0) and for 
each i = 1, ..., η either there is a con­
ditional statement Aj <- Ci in LP, or 
C{ = true and Κχ e LP. 
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We recall that an operator Γ is said to be monotonic if: 
V S J V S J Syc:S2 => r C S ^ c H S j ) 
We shall use the notations: 
rTO(S) = S 
rT(n+l)(S) = r ( rTn(S) ) u r t n ( S ) (neN) 
rTco(S) = u k e N r t k ( S ) 
In other words, r T l ( S ) denotes the set S augmented by the 
conditional immediate consequences that are computable 
from S. 
Finally, we recall that a least fixpoint of an operator Γ is by 
definition a set r t n ( S ) (neN*) such that: 
rtco(S) = r t n (S ) 
r i co(S)*rT(n- l ) (S) 
Lemma 4.1 
The operator T c is monotonic. I t has a unique 
least fixpoint. 
We define the 'conditional fixpoint' procedure for 
function-free logic programs. In [BRY 88a], we define it 
for logic programs with functions. 
Definition 42 
Let LP be a function-free logic program. The 
conditional fixpoint procedure performs in two 
successive phases: 
1. The fixpoint TcTco(LP) is computed. 
2 . T C TCD(LP) is reduced by recursively 
applying the following four rewriting 
rules: 
(F<r-true) -> F 
true Λ F —> F 
F Λ true —» F 
—iA -> true 
i f A is neither a fact, 
nor the head of a rule 
In Section 5 .2 , we give syntactical conditions that permit 
not to explicitly refer to dom(LP) for the computation of 
T C TCU(LP) during the first phase of the conditional fixpoint 
procedure. 
The rewriting system which defines the reduction phase is 
bounded and confluent [HUE 80]. Therefore, one verifies 
easily that the reduction phase always terminates. 
Note that the reduction phase yields a set of ground atoms. 
It is inspired of a proof procedure for propositional calculus 
due to Davis and Putnam [DP 60] - see also [CL 73, pp. 
63-66]. Indeed, conditional statements are ground, by 
definition of T C . The last rewriting rule of Definition 4 .2 
expresses the negation by failure principle. 
I f a logic program L P contains function symbols, then its 
domain and the least fixpoint T c Tco(LP) might be infinite. 
In such a case, i t is not possible to perform the reducing 
rewritings after the computation of the fixpoint T C TCD(LP) 
is completed. Instead, the generation of conditional state­
ments and their reduction have to be intertwined by level of 
term nesting. This is possible provided that the program is 
Nötherian, a property defined in [BRY 88a] that ensures 
that logic programs with functions obey the finiteness prin-
ciple. The conditional fixpoint procedure for Nötherian 
programs is defined in [BRY 88a]. 
The proof of the completeness of the conditional fixpoint 
procedure makes use of the following property. 
Lemma 4.2 
The formulas F Λ G => Η and F constructively 
imply G => H. 
Proposition 4.1 
The conditional fixpoint procedure decides facts 
in non-Horn, function-free logic programs. 
Note that false e TcTco(LP) i f and only i f LP is construc­
tively inconsistent. Properties ensuring constructive consis­
tency are investigated in the next section. 
5. Applications 
This section is devoted to applications of the constructivis-
tic view of logic programming. We apply it first for 
motivating the restrictions imposed on function-free logic 
programs in an intuitive manner, then for giving a construc-
tivistic basis to domain independent evaluations. Finally, 
we apply constructivism for extending the Generalized 
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Magic Sets procedure to constructively consistent non-
Horn programs. 
5.1. Constructive consistency and stratification 
In this section, we first show that the properties 
'stratification' [A* 88, VGE 88] and 'local stratification' 
are sufficient conditions of constructive consistency. Then, 
we introduce the class of 'loosely stratified' logic 
programs. This property, which is less stringent than 
stratification and local stratification, seems to be more con­
venient for practical applications. Finally, we show that the 
proof-theoretic formalization of logic programs and the 
model-theoretic treatment proposed in [A* 88] and [VGE 
88] are equivalent 
We consider in this section rules whose bodies are conjunc­
tions of literals or single literals, as in [A* 88, VGE 
88, PRZ 88b]. 
We shall use the word 'proof with the meaning of 'proof 
in CPC*. Given a logic program LP, we shall call 'proof in 
LP* a proof in CPC with set of proper axioms LP. We first 
give a characterization of proofs. 
Proposition 5.1 
Let LP be a logic program. Let F be a fact 
A proof of F in LP is F itself i f F eLP or a 
ground tree structure F 4 - Ρ such that: 
• There exist a rule Η < - Β in LP and a 
substitution σ such that Η σ = F. 
• Ρ is a proof of Β σ in LP. 
Assume that F £ LP. A proof of ->F in LP is true 
i f no head of a rule in LP unifies with F. Else it is 
a ground tree structure - i F <- Ρ such that: 
• The rules in LP whose heads unify with F 
are Hj <- Β £ with substitutions σ λ 
( i = l , . . . , n ) 
• Ρ is a proof of A ? I ^ in LP. 
Definition 5.1 
Let L < - Ρ be a proof of a ground literal L in a 
logic program LP. Let F be a fact occurring posi­
tively (negatively, resp.) in P. L is said to depend 
positively (negatively, resp.) on F in LP. 
Proposition 5.2 
A logic program LP is constructively consistent i f 
and only i f no fact depends negatively on itself in 
LP. 
Proposition 5.2 gives a very intuitive, equivalent condition 
of constructive consistency of a logic program. This con­
dition has been proposed and intuitively motivated by 
Deransart and Ferrand in [DF 87]. A similar intuition 
motivates the property 'sup-stratification' proposed by 
Bidoit and Froidevaux in [BF 88]. 
The following result shows that 'stratification* and 'local 
stratification' are sufficient conditions of constructive con­
sistency. We do not recall here the definition of these 
properties and refer to [A* 88, VGE 88] and to [PRZ 
88a, PRZ 88b], respectively. 
Corollary 5.1 
Stratified and locally stratified logic programs are 
constructively consistent 
Logic Program: 
P0O«-q (x ,y )A- ip (y ) 
q(a,D 
Herbrand Saturation: 
P(a)<-q(a,a)A-^p(a) 
p(a)<-q(a , l )A-np( l ) 
p ( l ) < - q ( U ) A - ^ p ( a ) 
ρ ( 1 ) < - ς ( 1 , 1 ) Α - φ ( 1 ) 
q(a,D 
Fig.l 
The converse of Lemma 5.1 does not hold. For example, 
the logic program of Figure 1 is constructively consistent 
but neither stratified, nor locally stratified. I t is not 
stratified because the rule defining ρ contains a negated 
p-atom in its body. It is not locally stratified since its 
Herbrand saturation contains instances of a rule in the body 
of which the head atom appears negatively. 
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The condition of constructive consistency is difficult to 
apply in practice, because it relies on all possible proofs. 
Since there are often fewer rules than facts, it is desirable to 
dispose of sufficient conditions of constructive consistency 
that depend on the rules only. 
The property 'stratification' is such a condition, since it 
implies the constructive consistency. The property 'local 
stratification' is fact independent too. However, i t relies on 
the Herbrand saturation of the program under considera­
tion. Therefore, i t is in practice as difficult to check as 
constructive consistency. 
We propose another sufficient condition of constructive 
consistency, which we call 'loose stratification'. Loose 
stratification is similar to, but less stringent than stratifica­
tion. Like stratification and local stratification, it does not 
depend on the facts occurring in the logic program under 
consideration. As opposed to local stratification, its defini­
tion does not depend on the Herbrand saturation. 
According to Lemma 1 in [A* 88, p. 97], a logic program 
LP is stratified i f and only i f the dependency graph [A* 88] 
of the rules in LP contains no cycles with negative arcs. For 
example, the rule 
p(x) <r- q(x,y) Λ -ΗΓ(Ζ,Χ) 
induces two arcs in the dependency graph: A positive arc 
P - > + q 
and a negative arc 
p - > - r 
Relying on the very intuition of the dependency graph, we 
define the 'adorned dependency graph' of a logic program 
as follows. Instead of predicates, we consider atoms with 
variable arguments as vertices of the adorned dependency 
graph. We define an arc between two atoms only i f they are 
unifiable. In addition, we adorn an arc joining an atom Αχ 
to an atom A 2 with a most general unifier of Αχ and A 2 . 
An arc is assigned a V or a ' - ' sign like in the conven­
tional dependency graph. 
Thus, the rule 
p(x,a) <- q(x,y) Λ -^(Ζ ,Χ) Λ -ip(z,b) 
yields a positive and a negative arc: 
P(x!,a) - > + ^ q(x 2 ,x 3 ) 
P i x ^ a ) ^ ^ ^ ^ ) 
Note that there is no arc from p(x l f a) to p(x 3,b). Indeed, 
these atoms do not unify because of the constants a and b. 
Formally, the adorned dependency graph is defined as fol­
lows: 
Definition 5.2 
Let LP be a logic program. Let V be the set of 
atoms occurring in rules in LP. Assume that V 
has been rectified such that distinct elements of V 
do not share variables. 
The adorned dependency graph of LP is the 
directed graph with set of vertices V and with set 
of arcs A defined as follows. 
Given Ax e V and A 2 e V, (Ax ->ö A{) e A i f 
there is a rule Η f - Β e LP and a most general 
unifier τ such that: 
• Αχτ = Ητ 
• s = V i f Α 2 τ occurs positively in Βτ. 
s = '-* i f Α 2 τ occurs negatively in Βτ. 
• σ is the restriction of τ to the variables 
occurring in Αχ and A^ 
We recall that η unifiers ..., σ η are said to be compatible 
i f there exists a unifier τ which is more general than each 
Gj. The definition of 'loose stratification' makes use of this 
notion and relies on the adorned dependency graph. 
Definition 53 
A logic program LP is said to be loosely stratified 
i f the adorned dependency graph of the rules in 
LP contains no finite chain 
C: A 2 ^ A 3 . . . A n ^ A n + 1 ) 
1 2 η 
such that: 
• C contains a negative arc, i.e., at least one 
^ is ' - ' . 
• the unifiers αχ, ..., σ η adorning the arcs 
along C are compatible. There is a unifier 
τ which is more general than each such 
that Α η + 1 τ = AjT. 
Intuitively, stratification forbids that a fact depends nega-
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lively on another fact with the same predicate letter. Loose 
stratification forbids such a dependence only i f the unifiers 
collected along the rules are compatible. It allows i t other­
wise. Like stratification, loose stratification depends only 
on the rules and can be checked without rule instantiation. 
Corollary 52 
Loosely stratified logic programs are construc­
tively consistent 
Stratified programs are loosely stratified, but the converse 
is false. For example, the program consisting of the rule 
p(x,a) <r- q(x,y) Λ -»r(z,x) Λ -.p(z,b) 
is loosely stratified since constants 'a' and 'b* do not unify, 
but i t is not stratified. The program of Figure 1 is not 
loosely stratified. The concepts of 'adorned dependency 
graph* and of 'loose stratification* are inspired of [LEW 
85]. 
For function-free logic programs, loose stratification and 
local stratification coincide [VIE 88, BRY 88a]. However, 
this is not the case for logic programs with functions. The 
relationship between loose stratification and local stratifica­
tion is investigated more thoroughly in [BRY 88a]. 
With the following proposition, we establish, for stratified 
programs, the equivalence between the proof-theoretic for­
malization with CPC and the model-theoretic one proposed 
in [A* 88] and [VGE 88]. 
Proposition 5.3 
Let F be a set of facts and R a stratified set of 
rules. A formula is a theorem of CPC with 
proper axioms FuR i f and only i f it is satisfied in 
the natural model of FuR. 
5.2. Constructive domain independence 
A constructive proof of an open formula F[x] or of a closed 
formula 3x F[x] consists in a proof of 'dom(t)' for some 
term Y followed by a proof of F[t]. In this section, we 
show how to avoid explicit references to the domain predi­
cates in constructive proofs. 
By the domain axioms, a proof of 'dom(t)' consists in a 
proof of a ground fact in which Y occurs. We shall say that 
a proof of *dom(t)' occurs redundantly in a proof Ρ if Ρ 
consists of a proof of 4dom(t)' and of a proof which implies 
'dom(t)\ For example, the proof of 'dom(a)' is redundant 
in the following proof 
[dom(a) <- q(a,b)] & [p(a)«- r(a,b) Λ s(a)] 
since p(a) => dom(a) by definition of the predicate 'dorn' 
(Section 4). 
Redundant occurences of 'dorn' atoms in proofs are charac­
terized by means of the concept of range. 
Definition 5.4 
Ranges for terms t l f ^ are recursively defined 
as follows: 
• P( t 0 ( 1 ) , . . . , 1 σ ( η ) ) is a range for t , , ^ i f Ρ 
is a predicate and σ a permutation of 
{1 n) . 
• Rj & R 2 is a range for t t , . . . . t^ i f Rx is a 
ranges for u 1 # u k (k > 0), R 2 is a ranges 
f o r v j , . . . , v h ( h > 0 ) , and 
{ t 1 . . . t n } = { u 1 . . . u k } u { v 1 , . . . , v h } 
• Rj ν R 2 an R 1 Λ R 2 are ranges for t j , 
t n i f both R^ are ranges for t j , . . . . t^ 
• A term (Η <- B) is a range for t j , t n i f 
Β is a range for t t , t ^ . 
Definition 55 
Let D be an atom with predicate 'dorn' and let 
D & P b e a p r o o f . 
D is redundant in the proof D & Ρ i f Ρ is a range 
for all terms occurring in D. 
The following concept gives rise to avoid the dom-
predicates in queries. 
Definition 5.6 
A formula F is constructively domain independ­
ent (cdi) i f for all constructive proofs Ρ of F, the 
proofs of domain facts contained in Ρ are redun­
dant in P. 
The following proposition gives a syntactical characteriza­
tion of constructively domain independent formulas. Note 
the occurrences of the ordered conjunction '&*. 
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Proposition 5.4 
Constructively domain independent (cdi) for­
mulas are recursively characterized as follows: 
• An atom A [ x l v . . , x n ] is a cdi formula. 
• The conjunction (Λ or & ) of two cdi for­
mulas is a cdi formula. 
• The disjunction of two cdi formulas with 
same free variables is a cdi formula. 
• I f Fj is a cdi formula and i f F 2 is any 
formula whose free variables are all free 
in F j , then Fj & F 2 is a cdi formula. 
• 5x F is a closed cdi formula i f F is an 
open cdi formula. 
• I f Fj is a cdi formula with free variable χ 
and i f F 2 is any formula with no free vari­
able other than x, then Vx - . [F j & -nF2] 
is a cdi formula. 
According to Proposition 5.4 the rule 
p ( x ) < - q ( x ) & - , r ( x ) 
is cdi, while the rule 
p(x) <- -tf(x) & q(x) 
is not. Prolog programmers are used to make variables in 
negative goals occunring in a preceding positive literal as 
well, in order to ensure correct runs of programs. Proposi­
tion 5.4 gives a logical motivation to this practice. 
Given a CPC theory C, let C c d i denote the calculus ob­
tained by removing the domain axioms from C. 
Lemma 5.1 
Let F[x] be an open formula with free variable x. 
I f F[x] is a range for χ then Vx F[x] => dom(x) 
holds. 
Proposition 5.5 
Let S be a finite set of cdi formulas satisfying the 
conditions imposed on proper axioms of a CPC. 
Let C denote the CPC with proper axioms S. 
Ccd[ and C are constructively equivalent. 
In [FAG 80], Fagin has studied the model-theoretic notion 
'domain independent' proposed by Kuhns [KUH 67] under 
the name 'definiteness*. Roughly, a formula F is domain 
independent i f its valuation in a model depends only on the 
extensions of the relations mentioned in F. The class 
domain independent formulas is not solvable [DIP 69]. 
However, the constructivistic restrictions imposed on proof 
implies the solvability of the class of constructively domain 
independent formulas. 
Corollary 5.3 
The class of constructively domain independent 
formulas is a solvable subclass of the domain in­
dependent formulas. 
Other solvable classes of domain independent formulas 
have been proposed: Range-restricted formulas [NIC 81], 
evaluable formulas [DEM 82,VGT 87], and allowed 
formulas [LT 86, VGT 87, SHE 88]. For each formula in 
one of these classes it is possible to construct an equivalent 
cdi formula [BRY 88b]. 
5.3. The Generalized Magic Sets procedure 
extends to non-Horn programs 
The Generalized Magic Sets procedure [BR 87] - also 
proposed under the name of Alexander procedure [R* 86] -
is a proof procedure for Horn logic programs with recursive 
axioms. It is not based on SLDNF-resolution [LLO 84]. In 
order to achieve a good efficiency in presence of huge 
amounts of facts, i t is * set-oriented'. We show in this sec­
tion how the concept of constructive proof and the con­
ditional fixpoint procedure permit to extend the General­
ized Magic Sets procedure to constructively consistent non-
Horn programs. By Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 the Generalized 
Magic Sets procedure therefore extends to stratified, locally 
stratified, and loosely stratified programs. 
In order to conform with the definition of the Generalized 
Magic Sets procedure, we consider in this section - like in 
Section 5.1 - rules whose bodies are literals or conjunc­
tions. In addition, we assume that they are constructively 
domain independent (cdi), i.e., rule's bodies are conjunc­
tions, some of them being ordered such that a negative 
literal with a variable χ follows a positive literal 
containing x. 
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The Generalized Magic Sets procedure answers a query on 
a program with rule set R and fact set F by performing 
three successive steps. First, the rules are specialized into a 
set R a d of adorned rules. Second, the set of adorned rules 
R a d is rewritten into a set R m g of rules intended for bottom-
up evaluation. Third, the fixpoint of the immediate con­
sequence operator on R m g u F is computed. 
The rule specialization R -» R a d of the first step and the 
rule rewriting R a d -» R m g of the second step are formally 
defined in [BR 87]. Here, we recall them on examples. 
Adorned rules are obtained by ordering the body literals. 
The (partial) ordering is chosen for optimally propagating 
the bindings of variables from the head of the rule back­
wards. Consider for example the rule: 
p(x,y)<-q(x,z)Ar(z,y) 
The ordering q(x,z) & r(z,y) is appropriate in presence of a 
goal such as ' p i a ^ y since the binding x/a is transmitted to 
the first body literal. As opposed, the ordering r(z,y) & 
q(x,z) is preferable for the goal 'pix^a) ' . 
In order to permit different orderings depending on the in­
stantiation pattern of the head, adorned predicates are intro­
duced. A binary predicate 'p ' for example induces adorned 
predicates like *p b f \ where 'b* ( T , resp.) denotes a bound 
(free, resp.) argument. For example, the rule 
p(x,y) < - r(z,y) Λ q(x,z) 
induces - among others - the adorned rule 
Ρ ^ ( χ , γ ) ^ ς Β ί ( χ , ζ ) & ^ ( ζ , γ ) 
The adorned rules are specialized forms of the original 
rules. 
According to Proposition 5.4, non-Horn cdi rules contain 
ordered conjunctions. In order to preserve cdi, the reor­
dering of body literals has to respect the ordered conjunc­
tions. Under this condition, we have: 
Proposition 5.6 
I f R is a set of cdi rules, then the rules in R a d are 
cdi. 
The second step of the Generalized Magic Sets procedure 
generates from R a d a set R m g of rules of two kinds. First, 
R m g contains magic rules representing the encountered sub-
goals in a backward - or top-down - evaluation of the 
adorned rules. For example, the rule 
p b f (x ,y) < - q b f (x,z) & ι**(ζ,γ) 
yields three magic predicates 'magic-p b f \ 'magic-q b f \ and 
'magic-r**'. 
It induces the two magic rules 
magic-q b f(x,z) <— magic-p b f(x,y) 
magic-r b f(z,y) < - magic-p b f(x,y) & q b f(x,z) 
In fact only 'b ' variables are kept in magic-predicates: For 
example, 'magic-p b f(x,y)' should be replaced by 
*magic-p b f(x)\ The magic rules of our example are there­
fore: 
magic-q b f(x) < - magic-p b f(x) 
magic-r b f(z) < - magic-p b f(x) & q b f(x,z) 
Queries induce ground magic facts, called seeds. The query 
'p(a,x)' induces for example the seed 'magic-p b f(a)\ 
The second type of rules in R m g are modified versions of 
the adorned rules. These versions are obtained by inserting 
magic atoms in the rules of R a d for constraining the instan­
tiations. For example, the rule 
p b f ( x , y ) < - q b W ) & i * W 
is rewritten into 
p b f (x,y) < - magic-p b f(x) & magic-q b f(x) & q(x,z) & 
magic-r^iz) & r(z,y) 
The rewriting R a d <— R m g can easily be extended to non-
Horn rules by processing negative literals like positive 
ones. For example, the rule 
ρ * ( χ ) « - ς * ( χ ) & - * * ( ζ ) 
induces the same magic atoms and magic rules as does the 
Horn rule 
It is therefore rewritten into 
p b f (x ,y) <r- magic-q b f(x) & q b f(x,z) & magic-r b f(z) & 
- ^ f ( z ) 
Assuming this extension of the rewriting R a d - » R m g , we 
have: 
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Proposition 5.7 
I f R a d is a set of cdi rules, then the rules in R m g 
are cdi. 
As it has been often noted, only the first of the two rewrit-
ings R - » R a d -> R m g preserves stratification. However, 
we show below that both preserve constructive consistency. 
By Corollary 5.1 this suffices to conclude to the correctness 
of the Magic Sets transformation for non-Horn logic 
programs. 
The technique we use for proving that both rewritings 
preserves constructive consistency, consists in transforming 
proofs in R a d and in R m g into proofs in R. 
Lemma 5.2 
A proof Ρ in R a d induces a proof in R by replac­
ing in Ρ the adorned predicates by the cor­
responding non-adorned predicates. A proof Ρ in 
R m g is reduced into a proof in R a d by pruning Ρ 
from proofs of magic atoms. 
Proposition 5.8 
Let R be a set of rules and F a set of facts. I f 
R u F is constructively consistent then R a d u F and 
R m g u F are constructively consistent. 
The third step of the Generalized Magic Sets procedure, 
namely the computation of the fixpoint of R m g u F , can be 
performed by applying the conditional fixpoint procedure 
of Section 4. I f R and therefore R m g contains function sym­
bols, the conditional fixpoint procedure as defined in [BRY 
88a] must be applied. 
In [BB* 88], Balbin, Meenakshi, Port, and 
Ramamohanarao have proposed to modify the Magic Sets 
rewriting in order to preserve stratification. They define a 
* structured' bottom-up procedure applicable to stratified 
programs. Kerisit proposes a similar method in his PhD 
thesis [KER 88]. Kerisit's rewriting is simpler than the 
other one. It generates programs that are not always 
stratified but satisfy a condition called 'weak stratification'. 
Kerisit defines a 'layered' bottom-up procedure for weakly 
stratified programs. The modified rewritings defined in 
these reports do not seem to extend to non-stratified con­
structively consistent programs. 
It is not clear i f an approach always permits better perfor­
mance than another on stratified programs. Because of its 
simplicity, the modified rewriting proposed by Kerisit 
seems to be preferable to the other one. The modified 
rewritings generate significantly more additional predicates 
than the Magic Sets rewriting. This certainly increases the 
complexity of the bottom-up evaluation. The bottom-up 
procedure can however make benefit from the weak 
stratification for not delaying the evaluation of negative 
premisses as long as the conditional fixpoint procedure 
does. 
Other recursive query processing procedures extend to 
stratified programs as well. Kemp and Topor [KT 88], and 
independently Seki and Itoh [SI 88] have recently defined 
such extensions for the twin procedures OLD-resolution 
with tabulation [TS 86] and QSQR/SLD-resolution [VIE 
87]. In [PRZ 89], these procedures have been further ex­
tended, relying on a concept of 'dynamic stratification', for 
processing all logic programs that have a well-founded 
model. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was twofold. It was first to show 
that the features of logic programming that seem unconven­
tional from the viewpoint of classical logic can be nicely 
explained in terms of constructivistic logic. This reading of 
logic programming is usually more intuitive to people not 
trained in formal logic. I t provides logical foundations for 
features often considered purely procedural. The second 
purpose of this paper was to apply the constructivistic for­
malization of logic programming for establishing new 
results of practical interest. 
We first recalled the complementary roles of model and 
proof theory for conveying the semantics of logic 
programs. Then, we showed how constructivism and logic 
programming are connected. We proposed a constructivis­
tic axiomatic system, the Causal Predicate Calculus (CPC), 
as a proof-theoretic formalization of non-Horn programs. A 
bottom-up proof procedure, the conditional fixpoint proce­
dure, was defined for CPC. 
4 7 
Next, we used this formalization of logic programming in 
order to establish practical results. First, we have given a 
simple and intuitive motivation for the concepts 
'stratification* and * local stratification': They are sufficient 
conditions of constructive consistency. Second, we intro-
duced the notion 'constructive domain independence', 
which gives a logical explanation of the need to 'keep 
ordered' certain conjunctions in logic programs. I t also 
constitutes a practical basis for introducing quantifiers into 
logic programs and queries. Finally, we showed how the 
concept of constructive proof and the conditional fixpoint 
procedure permit to extend the Magic Sets procedure to 
constructively consistent non-Horn logic programs. 
Being independent from any proof procedure, the construc-
tivistic formalization of logic programming should help in 
investigating various query evaluation techniques. It is 
indeed important to also investigate other evaluation 
strategies than the one of Prolog and SLDNF-resolution. 
The constructivistic reading of logic programming seems 
promising for studying 'logical optimization* techniques. 
Roughly, we mean methods that translate queries or rules 
into equivalent expressions, on the basis of logical rules or 
of integrity constraints. The main problem encountered in 
defining such rewritings is to control the number of 
generated expressions. The constructivistic restriction of 
logical equivalence seems to correspond to useful rewrit-
ings. Finally, a constructivistic understanding of logic pro-
gramming is surely applicable to the generation of intuitive 
explanations. 
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